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Abstract 
The paper examines how social projects, social spaces, and social realities define three 
contexts and shifts critical to understanding urban design in China. The transformations from 
collective forms to community building, from government to governance, and from urban 
versus rural development to urban-rural integration. The argument presented is that a unique 
unification of administration, production, and reproduction spaces into one institution, 
produced collective forms in China, whose collective spaces and collective subjectivities 
contrast with Western-centric explanations of urban design and urban sociology that depend 
on abstract notions of the public, public space, community, and place making. Instead, 
collective forms and collective spaces are defined by concrete activities, interests, and 
benefits that provide social networks of support and care to clearly identifiable 
constituencies. The collective and the community in China are thus always legibly spatialized 
and develop in parallel to a socialized model of governance that derives from a “differential 
mode of association.” This creates a spatialized governmentality, an instrumentalization of 
spatial design by government that brings spatial and social problems of governance closely 
together. A brief discussion of the historical formations of these changing contexts is the 
basis to outlining an interdisciplinary urban design approach that deals with spatial and 
social environments, practices, and policies. The paper brings together research conducted 
in Chinese cities including Wuhan, Beijing, and Shanghai.  
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Historically, in social, political, economic, and spatial terms, urban and rural areas in China 
were arguably all planned, designed, and administered at a “neighbourhood scale” that 
greatly varied in size, ranging from an urban community within an urban block to that of a 
district, or from a village community to that of a town. While some influences can be traced 
back to Clarence Perry’s concept of the “neighbourhood unit” and especially the 
“microdistrict” (mikrorayon) introduced by Soviet planners in the mid-1950s (Lu, 2006), the 
function of a neighbourhood was, more importantly, characterized by a unification of 
administration, production, and reproduction spaces into one institution that in its 
organization is specific to China. This organization is what I refer to as a collective form. 
Examples from China’s recent past include the rural people’s commune and the urban 
danwei (work unit), with the danwei being part of a long history of the development of walled 
and gated cities, neighbourhoods, residential and live-work compounds, and communities 
(Xu and Yang, 2009).  
 
While others have explained the “collective form” as foremost an urban design approach, 
whether by distinguishing between compositional, megastructural, and group forms (Maki, 
1964) or differentiating between urban individual (singular) and collective (repetitive) forms 
(Fan, 2016), I suggest that in the context of China, it should be understood as an 
experimental process in which administration, policy, and spatialization continuously interact, 
making it difficult to separate between cause and effect. For example, the relationships 
between five year plans, policy interpretations, pilot projects, and subsequent emergence of 
dominant urban and social models is not a simple matter of linear deduction and top-down 
implementation. Instead, regional social, economic, and political conditions or idiosyncrasies 
determine the way policies are translated and implemented.   
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Therefore, understanding how today’s prevalent community-based developments and 
community building agendas, exemplified in the gated communities of the urban xiaoqu 
(small district), are rooted in a legacy of collective forms and their socio-spatial 
characteristics is of importance. Although the context has fundamentally changed since the 
economic reforms started in 1978, they continue to play an essential part in administering 
access to housing and public or social services, remain a regulator of economic growth and 
labour migration, and still provide essential social security. But, changing demographics and 
lifestyles, a growing land and housing marketisation, and a shift from government to 
governance (Gui et al, 2009; Wu et al, 2007; Jeffreys and Sigley, 2006) have created new 
urban and rural community and spatial typologies to which planners, urban designer, and 
architects must respond. For example, unlike in the danwei period, work and living are 
separated and there is a rapid growth of an ageing population, with its social and economic 
pressures exacerbated by the generational imbalance of the 4-2-1 family structure① caused 
by decades of a one-child policy that was only abandoned in 2016. Although some of these 
general challenges of demographic and economic changes are global, we can see these 
shaped by specific problems and socio-spatial histories of collectivity in China.  
 
1. Collective space vs public space 
 
Collective forms in China are defined by spaces that considerably differ from Western-
centric, abstract concepts of the public, public space, community, and place making, and 
raise slightly different questions about representation, legitimacy, social care, and 
responsibility. It is therefore worthwhile to clarify the meaning of terms key to these 
differences.  
 
Whereas a “collective” has a hierarchical organization and a defined leadership, with its 
members submitting themselves to shared norms and demands in the pursuit of common 
goals and benefits, a “community” is formed by like-minded individuals with shared interests 
who equally contribute to its self-regulation and self-administration. A collective is normative, 
government and governance are closely linked, and often a direct form of policing is 
employed, while a community is defined by its structured forms of communication and a 
reliance on self-governance and self-policing.  
 
Based on this distinction, it is apparent why current governments desire community 
development, as this enables a sharing or handing over of responsibilities for public and 
social services and their management to grassroots organizations and the third sector. In 
addition, in historical terms, with all-encompassing collectivization in China in the 1950s, not 
the building of individual but collective subjectivities was the aim of new work practices, 
political participation, and a social contract based on social and work security (Bray, 2005), 
as well as new social networks or infrastructures of care. Therefore, paternalistic family and 
work organization – historically defined by kinship relationships of the clan, guild or gang,a 
and later by the nuclear family – were largely replaced by a pastoral socialist state, 
collectivist lifestyles, and new modes of production determined by a planned economy.  
 
The resultant collective forms and collective subjectivities are distinct from the idea of 
individual subjectivity and public space predominant in the West. The individual in China was 
seen as a constitutive part of a larger collective subjectivity. Significantly, the relationship 
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between individual and collective are hereby understood in what Fei Xiaotong (1949/1992) 
termed a “differential mode of association” through elastic and associational networks of 
personal and real-life relationships that are continuously changing and hereby define the 
experience of the individual in relation to the community. These changing interpersonal and 
associational relationships, I would add, are formative to all social relationships and exist 
beyond a distinction between collective or communal governance. Thus, collective and 
community are conceptually and practically in governance terms less distinct, as institutional 
relationships are always experienced through an individualized and socialized lens of 
governance (Woodman, 2016).  
 
The Western conception in comparison assumes a strong dialectic between individual, 
collective, and community, whereby a conflict between individual interests and the common 
good needs to be continuously negotiated, with an individual’s subjectivity and rights taken 
as fundamental to one’s identity and place in society. This premise underlies, for example, 
Ferdinand Tönnies’s distinction between community and society that has come to dominate 
urban discourse and urban sociology. But, Fei (1949/1992) distinguishes between a Chinese 
“differential” and a Western “organizational” mode of association, in which all individuals 
within an organization share the same relationships and boundaries. Real-life relations are 
accordingly essentially subordinated to an idealized, abstract, and institutional organization 
that de-spatializes the understanding of communities. 
 
Consequently, a public space in the Western tradition does not mean the same as a 
collective space, but implies a political space of communication, a space for individual 
expression of rights while addressing society at large (its nostalgic prototype being the 
Greek agora). In contrast, collective spaces in China often simply just provide spaces for 
concrete everyday uses and activities, through which associational relationships between 
individual and individual, but also between individual and the collective, are reinforced. This 
is also reflected in how these spaces are owned. The collective space is normally collectively 
owned by a group of people living and working closely around it – for example the extended 
family, the village collective, the danwei – and spatializes and reinforces personal social 
relationships, whereas public space is typically owned and managed by the state on behalf 
of society, hereby institutionalizing and abstracting social relationships. 
 
Why does this all matter? Because Western public spaces are increasingly commercialized, 
homogenized, and socially ineffective. They are often more symbolic than functional. The 
Chinese activity-based collective space offers thus an alternative framework to 
understanding how shared spaces can function, as collective spaces always serve 
identifiable constituents and their shared – but also at times individual – activities. Collective 
forms are an important heritage of collective infrastructures and collective subjectivities.  
 
The social and economic structures harking back to a national collectivization in the 1950s, 
have remained effective beyond a de-collectivization and reform of the people’s commune 
and danwei systems in the 1980s until today. Thus, current problems of neighbourhood 
transformations and urbanization in China must be seen in relationship to historical 
communal or collective development models. The contemporary urban xiaoqu and new 
community building at grassroots-level government (shequ), the “new socialist countryside” 
program and rural village reforms, elderly-friendly communities, smart communities, or 
community renewal projects are all responses to new socio-economic demands, 
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demographic changes, and changing governance needs. While answering to ongoing social, 
political, and economic transformations that are part of a larger global trend, they are also 
deeply contextual to historical government policies and a parallel socialist conception and 
spatial design of communities in China. They created new dominant social and urban spaces 
specific to China, which is well recognized by sociologists, economists, and political 
scientists (Xie et al, 2009; Bray, 2005; Lu, 1989; Walder, 1986), but less so by spatial 
designers.  
 
However, especially for urban designers it is essential to better understand why “public 
space” is in historical terms a misnomer in China and how shared types of spaces are rooted 
in collective life and more accurately described as a “collective space.” Despite similar 
appearance, it differs in conception and function from Western notions of public space and 
its common association with a public sphere (Habermas, 1962/1989), which are ideas 
discussed in China for less than 30 years. Many spaces are simply open spaces and, 
resulting from a collective landownership system defined by family and community 
structures, are for the use of local residents (Heberer and Göbel, 2011). Therefore, this is a 
very different, but important and complementary, milieu to that found in the West to define 
challenges of urban transformations and experiences and their impact on spatial design 
processes. It has clear implications for how we can understand and define a framework for 
urban design thinking and practice in China, some of which I will discuss in the following. 
 
2. Three contexts of urban design in China 
 
When the idea of a public space was introduced in China in the mid-1990s, its difference to 
existing collective spaces was largely disregarded. Western-style “public” spaces came 
along with a reorientation from pure planning to design problems in China, with urban design 
introduced by Chinese planning authorities and adopted by practitioners. The rising 
importance of urban design was tied to developing design guidelines capable of integrating 
the needs of communities and relatively smaller developments into very large urban plans. 
Yet, significant differences exist in how urban design in China deals with placemaking, local 
communities, and scale. Imported Western design models – as most urban designers in 
China were either foreign-trained or foreigners – have not translated well into a context of 
larger development plots, a dominance of state-owned Local Design Institutes, and a lack of 
public participation and a third sector (Loew, 2013).  
 
While there is currently a noticeable and significant shift to smaller scales of design, urban 
design was until recently mostly seen as serving larger planning objectives and bringing 
economic value by preparing smaller plots of large urban plans for real-estate development. 
The failure of urban design to better understand and instrumentalize its grounding in socio-
economic and political aims, reveals a limitation of its traditional interdisciplinary focus on 
architecture, planning, and landscape architecture. A more comprehensive integration of 
urban sociology, social policy, and spatial planning is thus urgently needed to cross 
established disciplinary, methodological, and cultural boundaries. To advance this, I propose 
that a China-specific interdisciplinary urban design approach can be framed by how social 
projects, social spaces, and social realities shape three contexts critical to understanding 
past and present spatial design and planning in China, and by asking what the underlying 
conceptual and spatial transformations are. More specifically, this looks at three shifts 
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through which socio-spatial planning and urban design in China can be read as informed by 
the political and collective.  
 
2.1 From government to governance 
The first context is architecture, urban design, and urban planning as a technology of 
“governmentality” (Foucault, 2007). It is particularly a “spatialization of governmentality,” 
meaning when spatial forms correlate to social forms and become a technology of 
government. An example of this is the danwei, in which the emergence of designed modern 
spatial forms as a rational technique of government is particularly legible (Bray, 2005). This 
is therefore also closely related to the question of how a change from government to 
governance has created or is creating particular social and spatial development forms or 
specific urban experiences, and what lessons can be learned from them? For example, the 
restructuring of the lowest level of government administration and grassroots organization 
from the danwei to the subdistrict and street office since economic reforms in China – or 
from the people’s commune to the town – while perhaps inevitable, is also a deliberate 
attempt to rescale spatial, social, and political management and development by creating 
new administrative units, new grassroots organizations, new neighbourhoods, and new 
types of community, as well as new urban design problems and criteria. 
 
2.2 From collective forms to community building 
The second context is the transformation of collective forms and subjectivities originating in 
the Mao Era into contemporary community building agendas and policies. The nationally 
enforced danwei and people’s commune systems were exemplary in instituting a unit of total 
planning that provided rights and identity, but also extensive control over the population by 
managing access to housing, employment, health- and childcare, social welfare, schooling, 
culture, sports, and political and cultural education. It also replaced traditional, patriarchal 
kinship and family structures with a socialist pastoral state and collectivist lifestyles defined 
by work relationships.  
 
This history of collective forms hereby anticipated some of the changes we see widely 
emerge today globally, for example, a disappearing nuclear family (married couples and their 
children) as a social and spatial planning norm, and a diversification of the household 
structure. We are witnessing these changes today more noticeably due to demographic 
transformations, such as an ageing society, but also due to rising housing costs, as the open 
market has failed to sufficiently self-regulate while welfare states are waning. Out of this has 
arisen a growing need for intergenerational housing, coupled with a need for new social 
networks of care – both driven by a declining social support by the traditional family and a 
disappearing nuclear family-bound idea of domesticity. The collective forms were in this 
respect an early attempt to create non-familial social networks and promoted a close 
integration of work-live-education, which is currently also greatly endorsed by knowledge-
based economies. It has informed China-specific meanings of collectives and communities 
that in turn define the context and beneficiaries of current urban design practice. 
 
2.3 From urban versus rural to urban-rural integration 
The third context is how this history of collective forms is influencing current socio-spatial 
changes in urban and rural developments in China, and a redefinition of planning or design 
scales and terminology relevant to practice, theory, and pedagogy. Despite policy reforms 
dealing with landownership, rural-urban integration, and the hukou (household registration) 
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system, socio-economic inequality and large-scale labour migration persist. This is largely 
due to biased economic policies that since the 1960s have focused on urban development.  
 
This context also relates to an interdisciplinary perspective of how design research can 
contribute to urban and community studies, and how social and urban design or planning 
policies are related. For example, reforms in hukou and economic policies have led to 
changes in the provision of public services and a need for new urban planning attitudes and 
approaches. Therefore, this context also considers how a shift in focus towards an urban-
rural integration and smaller planning scales is related to the provision and design of public 
services and social welfare infrastructures. It is hereby as much about social security as it is 
about growing a capacity for self-governance and non-governmental responsibility for public 
services. Generalizing, what this third context is concerned with is an ongoing transition from 
a collective to a community-based organization of the population, which started in the 1990s 
and runs in parallel to a gradual shift from government to governance. 
 
3. The people’s commune and danwei 
 
To understand in greater detail the heritage and influence of collective forms on current 
urban design problems, I will outline how the nationally enforced danwei and people’s 
commune systems in China were exemplary in instituting a unit of total planning that 
provided rights and identity, but also extensive controls over the population by managing 
employment, housing, and all aspects of education and welfare. The “three contexts” of 
urban design in China and their shifts are characterized and legible through the socio-spatial 
changes conditioned by a transition from the people’s commune and danwei to the xiaoqu.  
 
One precedent of the danwei can be found in the radical phase of Soviet commune planning 
in the late 1920s. Deriving from Leonid Sabsovich’s economic model, the housing commune 
realized a Sotsgorod idea of socialist settlements for workers of state-owned industrial units 
and farms. The Sotsgorod was divided into smaller collective housing communes with a few 
thousand inhabitants each. Complementary to, yet separated from, production areas, the 
commune was dedicated to providing social services that framed the collective life of its 
inhabitants. In an unrealized project by Nikolai Kuzmin (1883 – 1938) from 1929, a 
mandatory “super-collectivism” was imposed by: removing all private life and reducing 
shared bedrooms to the minimum, controlling daily routines by breaking them down into 
detailed activities and by providing for these centrally placed collective spaces such as a 
dining hall and facilities for education, culture, sports, and socialization, and by physically 
separating families and making the caring for children and the elderly a collective 
responsibility (see Figures 1 & 2). The Chinese collective forms acknowledged this Soviet 
speculation on spatialized governmentality, but also profoundly exceeded it by closely 
bringing together all working and living activities.  
 
The campaign to establish people’s communes in China was officially launched in August 
1958 as part of the Great Leap Forward②. Already a month later, people’s communes 
incorporated 90.4% of rural households, making approximately 77% of China’s population 
part of a rural commune (Lu, 2007). Their purpose was to increase productivity and create a 
new autonomous grassroots unit replacing the township, the lowest direct administrative 
level of government, and taking on its far-reaching responsibilities for local government 
administration and commune management, including the coordination of industry, 
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agriculture, finance, trade, education, military affairs, and public services. The three 
administrative levels of the people’s commune were the administrative committee, the 
production brigade, and the production team. A typical example of this is the Shigushan 
Brigade (today Shigushan Village) in the Xinzhou District, Wuhan, that was built in the early 
1970s at a production brigade-level as part of the Phoenix Commune, which was first 
established in 1958 (see Figure 3). The rural commune system lasted until 1984, when these 
administrative responsibilities were returned to the level of the township. 
 
But Kuzmin’s socio-spatial design principles are especially legible in one of the earliest 
examples of a planned commune settlement, that for the Panyu People’s Commune from 
1959. The scheme for a new settlement in Guangdong is divided into five sectors, which 
each have clear functions and service facilities placed right in their centers. The housing is 
entirely made up of two flat typologies and their variations (see Figure 4). The individual 
units have no kitchens or bathrooms, and are not planned as functional family units. The 
different residential building typologies are based on a simple combination of the flat 
typologies for couples and single workers. The minimization of private space is made 
possible by providing at the building scale, shared washrooms and toilets, as well as a 
disproportionately large amount of public facilities for the commune with diverse functions. 
The most important of these are multifunctional, public canteens, which form the physical 
centers for each cluster as well as the daily routines of workers (see Figure 5). What Panyu 
shows is a symmetry between the overprovision of public facilities – of collective spaces – 
and the reduction of private space to reinforce a collective lifestyle in which working, living, 
and learning is synchronized. 
 
In a shift from rural to urban planning, the danwei emerged, which dominated the urban 
development and industrialization of China from the late 1950s to the 1990s. While only 
partially a direct urban translation of the rural people’s commune – and rather developing in 
parallel – it also had extensive economic, administrative, and social welfare functions. A 
danwei can greatly differ in scale, and is predominantly the outcome of the size of company 
or institution it is defined by and which it spatially demarcates. Its inclusion of public or 
commercial functions are equally not fixed, but depend on the economic standing of the 
danwei. This makes the danwei a pliable administrative and economic and social model. In 
the case of the Wuhan Iron and Steel Corporation (WISCO), a major industrial danwei in 
Wuhan, it occupied a territory equivalent to a large urban district (see Figure 6). This means 
it had to take on corresponding administrative and social service burdens.  
 
In contrast to WISCO, the Luoyang Research and Design Institute for Non-Ferrous Metals 
Processing only occupied a relatively small urban block (see Figure 7). The Luoyang case is 
an example of a very compact danwei and a typical transformation of danweis since the 
1990s. Its work, housing, and living or social support functions are clearly zoned. Most of its 
original housing was built in the 1960s to 80s, and there is a typical range of unit typologies 
for families and single workers. Since the mid-1990s, the danwei had to redevelop some of 
its existing housing with larger units that can be sold on the open market. What at first simply 
looks like common real-estate speculation, is therefore part of a larger economic demise of 
an industrial state-owned enterprise, as well as its need to create new income to support its 
(former) workers, with land and real estate one of the few available assets that a danwei can 
exploit.  
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4. The xiaoqu 
 
What the transformations of the Luoyang danwei shows is an extensive urban change in 
China since the 1990s from the danwei to the xiaoqu system, which became the new 
dominant urban development model and collective space. The decline of industrial 
manufacturing led in 1984 to state-owned enterprises being released from their responsibility 
to provide welfare functions, which made a rethinking of urban policy and governance 
necessary. These urban transformations and challenges are evident in a number of xiaoqus 
we studied in 2018 in China, and which can be considered as relatively typical examples. 
These included the Geguang Community, Wuhan (developed 1994, 1996, 1998, 2003), the 
Miaosan Community, Wuhan (developed early 1980s and 2000), the Xinyuan Xili 
Community, Beijing (started in the early 1980s), and the Hongmei Xiaoqu, Shanghai (built 
from 1996). 
 
With the xiaoqu, a whole matrix of ownership and demographics has emerged that, with an 
increasing commodification of housing, moves currently towards privatization and private 
ownership (see Figure 8). There are communities that are still owned and occupied by a 
danwei and its employees, some that are built by danweis to relocate their workers off 
valuable urban sites so that they can be redeveloped for profit, and completely private and 
commercial xiaoqus. But the majority of cases we looked at have a mix of former danwei 
residents and private, external owners – we deliberately excluded completely private xiaoqus 
from our study. Yet, what they have in common is that all xiaoqus continue to spatially 
demarcate and define a clearly identifiable community and its members. This is because a 
community is still, first of all, an administrative space or governing unit according to whose 
size, wealth, and demography, social services and rights are exclusively provided to its 
residents. The services and rights are assured either due to historical or continued danwei 
relationships, or are purchased in private xiaoqus, which tend to have better quality services 
– although this does not necessarily mean that these services are used by more residents. 
In many other cases, the state steps in, creating a large-scale challenge to rationalize costly 
state provision.  
 
In the xiaoqu, self-governance, state representation, public or shared services, and 
spatialization continue to be strongly linked, and therefore urban communities are still 
defined by their rights to social services, care, and infrastructures. This is an interesting point 
for comparison, considering that European countries, for example, are increasingly trying to 
re-establish this relationship between community, social care, physical area, and 
governance. A community is typically made up of several xiaoqus, for which it might have 
different levels of administrative responsibility. While community governance varies from city 
to city, in general its administrative level is the resident’s committee in which community and 
Communist Party of China representation overlap. Therefore, despite growing privatization, 
the Communist Party of China had to ingrain itself at a much smaller scale and to a much 
larger extent than before the economic reforms. In fact, with the failure of creating an 
efficient and affordable market for services and management of residential communities – 
especially in poor and old communities – the government has reentered many of the urban 
communities it left in the beginning of the economic reform period (Wu, 2018). Despite this, 
in addition to the resident’s committee, most xiaoqus have a property management 
company, responsible for managing and maintenance of public areas and facilities, and an 
owner’s committee if there is private housing. Although there are xiaoqus that only have 
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privately owned commodity housing, which are managed by the property owners and their 
elected representatives, the government retains some direct influence and even some 
responsibilities – certainly in comparison, for example, to private developments in Europe. 
Thus, within the community governance structure – especially in the older, mixed-tenure 
communities we studied in China – there is a mixture of Communist Party of China 
representatives, community representatives, elected and employed committee members as 
well as community volunteers that work together to administer a community and maintain a 
social network of support (see Figure 9). I would argue, that despite obvious conflicts and 
problems, for community-controlled developments to have legitimacy and the power to make 
and implement decisions, some state involvement and a clearly identifiable and accountable 
governance body is necessary, something that is often lacking in community-led 
developments in places such as the United Kingdom.  
 
Considering the origins of collective forms and collective spaces in the rural people’s 
commune and their codification in the urban danwei, whose collapse led to an urban 
transformation and rise of urban xiaoqus, and further considering the new integration of 
urban-rural development and policies, we can see the closing of a long rural-urban-rural 
cycle of socio-spatial changes.  
   
To return to an earlier discussion of collective spaces, I would like to examine how in the 
xiaoqu they offer opportunities for both individual and shared uses (see Figure 10). The 
appropriation of collective spaces is at times contradictory, as individuals often unhindered 
claim large parts of them for their personal use, as in the case of many illegally erected 
structures. These illegal private and commercial functions and structures, which sometimes 
provide services to the community or are consensually shared by residents, can be 
described as self-organized. Other uses can be classified as semi-planned, which include 
adaptation of spaces designed for collective use, ranging from appropriations or use by 
individuals to group activities. The self-organized and semi-planned uses of a shared space, 
especially the first kind of use, clearly show how these spaces retain key characteristics of a 
collective space. If these were Western public spaces, the individual appropriations found in 
China would be seen as breaking with common rules or laws that govern their use and 
would lead to exclusion from the space. Finally, planned uses refer to collective spaces in 
the form of buildings that provide services, such as a service center run by the street office 
or a privately-operated commercial center. The matrix emerging from these different uses 
shows how associational relationships are established and maintained through planned uses 
and spontaneous appropriations of collective spaces. Given a concrete and direct, yet 
unstable, relationship between space, user, and use, it is possible that collective spaces 
both support and contradict a normative understanding of common space, as they are 
equally used for individual and shared purposes. To say it differently, while public spaces are 
normally protected from appropriations, especially appropriations by individuals, what we 
see here is a continuous socio-spatial appropriation, a process that is productive to 
community building.   
 
Considering a decline of large-scale projects and a shift to smaller scales of design, 
planning, and governance in China, it is not a coincidence that young design practices are 
becoming interested in issues of community building and urban design. For example, MAT 
Office has taken a very different approach to its renewal of the Xinyuan Xili community in 
Beijing, one of the case studies we analyzed. Based on a comprehensive study of the site 
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and its socio-spatial needs, MAT Office identified strategic small interventions sites 
throughout the community. This led them to developing an intervention toolbox instead of a 
fixed masterplan. It acknowledges the need for an urban design approach whose 
implementation can be negotiated between stakeholders over time instead of presenting a 
final outcome. This also aligns with new community design guidelines as, for example, 
promoted in the recently published Technical Guidelines of Working Mechanism and Design 
for Community Planning in Wuhan (2018) by ATA Architectural Design, which sets out the 
policy contexts, stakeholder involvement, and decision-making processes to develop a 
community plan.  
 
5. Conclusion  
Collective forms provide insights into today’s urban design problems, especially into the 
unstable relationships between constituency, space, ownership, and use. The collective 
spaces deriving from a history of collective forms are not the same social space as a public 
space. This is important, because a critical role of urban design is to establish spaces for 
shared or rather differentiated “collective” use. To advance then a possible framework for an 
interdisciplinary urban design thinking and practice in China today, I would in summary like 
to make the following claims:  ① Communities are still defined by the social services and infrastructures they provide to 
their members. This is an important heritage of collective forms from the Mao Era and of 
great relevance to global community debates. It raises a question of how this can be 
adapted better to demographic transformations, changing social needs, and cultural 
diversification. ② Communities continue to have strong administrative functions. Their governance as 
grassroots organization include a diverse mix of state and community representatives. 
While residents’ committee employees such as social workers are paid for by the state, 
maintenance and investment in the xiaoqus depend on the ownership of housing and 
are increasingly paid for by property owners instead of the state or state-owned 
enterprises. This combination of stakeholders and responsibilities gives communities 
political and social legitimacy and, potentially, provides access to the specialized 
knowledge and skills needed to develop community plans or participate in decision-
making processes, but can also lead to conflicts between stakeholders. Despite many 
challenges, there is some noticeable resilience in these community governance 
structures and the new types of collective spaces they produce. ③ Collective spaces are defined by associational relationships. Their relations to user and 
activities are direct and their ownership collective. Individual and shared claims to 
collective spaces can be contradictory, but permit coexistence, and their socio-spatial 
appropriation often strengthen relationships between individuals and the collective or 
community they belong to.   
 
Urban design thinking that considers the contexts outlined in this paper, has to 
simultaneously deal with spatial and social environments, practices, and policies. The 
historical transformations leading to the dominance of the urban xiaoqu reinforce community 
planning as a socio-spatial problem, and we therefore have to regard urban design as 
concerned with both designing a built and social environment. Thus, a new multi-scalar and 
interdisciplinary approach is needed that brings multiple stakeholders and disciplines 
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together in a design process. Architecture, urban design, and planning are hereby important 
instruments of socio-spatial realization and spatialized governmentality. 
 
(This paper has been presented at the symposium Collective Forms: The Chinese 
Neighbourhood Unit held at the Tsinghua University, Beijing, on 8th September 2018. It was 
supported by the British Academy’s The Humanities and Social Sciences Tackling the UK’s 
International Challenges Programme 2017.) 
 
Edited by Liu Jinxin & Liu Jiayan 
 
Editor’s note: ① “4-2-1 family structure” refers to a family consisting of four seniors, a couple who are both 
the only child of their respective family, and their only child. ② The “Great Leap Forward” was a campaign by the Chinese communists during the 
Second Five-Year Plan, which was aimed at transforming the country from an agrarian 
economy into a socialist society through rapid industrialization and collectivization. It ended 
up causing a severe social and economic disaster. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
Axonometric of Housing Commune for the coal mine No. 5/7 in Anzhero-Sudzhensk, Nikolai 
Kuzmin (1928 – 1929).  
Drawing key: 1 housing for single workers (groups of 6 – 8 people); 2 housing for couples; 3 
housing for children; 4 nursery; 5 kindergarten; 6 school; 7 communal center/social club 
(theater, library, meeting rooms, workspaces); 8 communal dining hall; 9 sports 
facilities/gym; 10 swimming pool.  
Source: Jacoby, 2016. 
 
Figure 2 
 
Typical unit plans of Housing Commune, Nikolai Kuzmin (1928 – 1929)  
Left: shared accommodation for adults; right: accommodation for couples. Drawing key: 1 
bedroom; 2 changing room; 3 WC; 4 shower; 5 terrace.  
Source: Jacoby, 2016. 
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Figure 3 
 
Diagram of commune settlement (Shiguhan Village), Phoenix People’s Commune (1970s)  
Source: AA Visiting School 2017, drawn by Olga Konyukova, Yuan Bixiao, and Ye Mingyu.  
 
Figure 4 
 
 
Housing and unit typologies for the Panyu People’s Commune  
Source: School of Architecture, South China University of Technology, 1959. 
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Figure 5 
 
Public canteen in Panyu  
Drawing key: 1 women’s bathroom; 2 men’s bathroom; 3 men’s toilet; 4 women’s toilet; 5 
storage; 6 staff housing; 7 water storage; 8 boiler room; 9 coal storage; 10 washroom; 11 
kitchen; 12 office; 13 dining hall; 14 tea garden; 15 shop; 16 workshop; 17 tea house.  
Sources: School of Architecture, South China University of Technology 1959 (top); redrawn 
by Yuan Rongwei and Yan Ting from Architectural Journal (bottom). 
 
Figure 6 
 
Masterplan of the Wuhan Iron and Steel Corporation  
Source: Wuhan Iron and Steel Corporation, 1983 
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Figure 7 
 
Masterplan of the Luoyang Research and Design Institute for Non-ferrous Metals Processing  
Drawing key: A Work Area 1 (design department); B Work Area 2; C Western Living Area; D 
Eastern Living Area; a office; b canteen; c clinic; e kindergarten; f bachelor’s quarter; g 
bathhouse/barber shop; h workshop; i storage; j garage (bicycles); k activity center for the 
elderly; m commercial rental space.  
Source: Drawing by Li Chenyu.  
 
Figure 8 
 
Housing ownership matrix (today) based on analyzed case studies 
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Figure 9 
 
Governance structure of the Geguang Community in Wuhan  
 
Figure 10 
 
Matrix of collective spaces and their uses (from left to right and top to bottom)  
Column 1 / row 1: illegal construction and extensions. Column 1 / row 2: illegal structure for 
key and shoe repairs, extension to building lobby, illegal health salon, and illegal repair shop. 
Column 2 / row 1: drying peanuts; extension of home. Column 2 / row 2: playground / 
different users; pavilion used for leisure activities; children playground. Column 3 / row 2: 
service center exterior and interior. Column 3 / row 3: commercial center. 
